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Introduction
The district court erred when it declared that the State owned title to the
bed of the Weber River through the section of river at issue here. The Utah
Stream Access Coalition (USAC) lacked standing to bring a title claim on behalf
of the State, and the district court, therefore, lacked jurisdiction to declare title in
the State. The district court also plainly erred in failing to apply the statutory test
for navigability set out in HB 141. The state navigability test for recreational access
is based on present-day commercial use, whereas the federal navigability test for

title looks to the date of statehood. Finally, even if the statute had adopted the
federal test for navigability, the court erred when it ruled that the floating of logs
during temporary times of high water is enough to satisfy the federal test.
Argument
1.

The district court erred in declaring that fixed title to the streambed in
the State because USAC did not have standing to seek such a
determination and the trial court therefore lacked jurisdiction to grant it
The district court, in its ruling of April10, 2015, declared that (i) the public

is "entitled to use the riverbed of the Weber River at [the location of Landowner
Properties] for lawful recreational purposes," and (ii) "the State of Utah holds
sovereign land title to the bed ... at the location of the Landowner Properties."

(R. 892.) In its opening brief, Orange Street argued that the district court erred in
making the title-declaration because the State had made no claim for a title
determination and USAC lacked standing to seek one. Orange St. Opening Br. at
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29-33. In its response brief, the State agreed that the district court's title
declaration should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction. State Resp. Br. at 22-29. As
the State noted, " [a] quiet title case would require a different plaintiff, a different
cause of action, and a different form of relief." Id. at 24.
USAC is ambivalent in its response to Orange Street's argument. Although
it originally asked the district court to determine title in its complaint, (R. 8-9.), it
later told the district court that it was not seeking a title determination. (R. 337.)
In its brief to this court, it repeatedly states that it is not seeking to have title
quieted in the State. USAC Resp. Br. at 18 n.4, 20, 26, 30. Yet USAC spends
considerable time briefing why it should have standing to raise the question of
title. Id. at 18-31. The reason seems to be USAC fears that if this court accepts
Orange Street's separate argument that HB 141 did not adopt the federal
navigability for title test, USAC, for some reason, will be denied standing to
claim an alternative right of recreational access under the Utah Constitution. Id.
at 18-19. Orange Street has made no such argument.
Orange Street's position is that members of the public who claim denial of
access to public waters to which they are entitled under HB 141 have standing to
bring an action to assert that right of access, if they meet the usual standing tests.
But no claim of a right of access should give standing to assert, on behalf of the
State of Utah, a claim to have title quieted in the State on grounds of navigability
for title. The concern that seems to prompt USAC to hedge its repeated
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disavowals of a right to seek a title determination is not grounded in any position
taken by Orange Street.l The relief of a title declaration that property belongs to
the State can only be given at the request of the State. A private party without
any associated interest does not have standing to make such a claim.
The district court's entry of a declaration of title in the State presents a
troubling precedent to private landholders. It permits parties without tangible
interests in property to obtain a title declaration that may remove certain of the
landowners' property rights with potentially far-ranging consequences. The
issue is similarly troublesome for the State, which is justifiably concerned about
the orderly administration of public property and land titles. This case is not
about title, but about access to public waters. Because USAC, who has no claim
to title, does not have standing to litigate the rights of the State to the bed of the
Weber River under HB 141, this court should vacate the district court's title
determination for a lack of jurisdiction.

The reason for USAC's hedging on the question of standing appears to be that it
separately contends its members have a constitutional right founded in article
XX, section 1 of the Utah Constitution to access waters that qualify as navigable
under the federal title test, regardless of the Utah Legislature's enactment of HB
141. USAC Resp. Br. at 26, 30-31. But that issue was not addressed by the district
court and is not before this court in this case. This case only involves access
under HB 141. The article XX, section 1 issue is one of several before this court in
the separate case of Utah Stream Access Coalition v. VR Acquisitions, LLC, No.
20151 048-SC.
1
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2.

The language of the navigation definition in HB 141 does not track the
federal test; this court should clarify the statutory test for access
Orange Street argued in its opening brief that the language of the

navigability test in HB 141 does not track the federal navigability for title test.
Orange St. Opening Br. at 33-38. HB 141' s navigability test reads in the present
tense. Utah Code§ 73-29-102(4). It requires a determination of the present
susceptibility of a water's use for commerce and as a public highway of
transportation. In contrast, the federal navigability test for title asks after the
susceptibility of a water's use for trade and travel at statehood. United States v.
Utah, 283 U.S. 64,75 (1931) ("In accordance with the constitutional principle of
the equality of states, the title to the beds of rivers within Utah passed to that
state when it was admitted to the Union, if the rivers were then navigable .... ");
Orange St. Opening Br. at 35-37.2 The State and USAC acknowledge this critical
time difference in the text of HB 141, but argue that the intention of the drafters
as determined from the legislative history suggests that they intended to use the
federal navigability test for title. State Resp. Br. at 9-10; USAC Resp. Br. at 33.
This court has held that the text is primary when interpreting a statute.
Our evaluation of the statute's purpose must start with its text, not
the legislative history. Where the statute's language marks its reach
in clear and unambiguous terms, it is our role to enforce a legislative
purpose that matches those terms, not to supplant it with a narrower
Orange Street did not raise this issue below. But the plain error doctrine permits
this court to address it. Orange Street Opening Br. at 34-37. The variance between
the text and the test applied by the district court warrants this court's attention.
The consequences for owners of property along bodies of water require
clarification of the relevant test, either by this court or the legislature.
2
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or broader one that we might infer from the legislative history. That
history might identify a social problem that first sparked the
legislature's attention. But we cannot presume that the legislature
meant only to deal with that particular problem, as legislative bodies
often start with one problem in mind but then reach more broadly in
their ultimate enactment. And when they do, we cannot limit the
reach of their enactment to the ill that initially sparked their interest.

Hooban v. Unicihj Intern., Inc., 2012 UT 40,, 17, 285 P.3d 766 (citations omitted);
see also Bd. of Governors of Fed. Res. Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp.,474 U.S. 361,374
(1986) ("Invocation of the 'plain purpose' of legislation at the expense of the
terms of the statute itself takes no account of the processes of compromise and, in
the end, prevents the effectuation of congressional intent."); Brogan v. United

States, 522 U.S. 398, 403 (1998) ("[T]he reach of a statute often exceeds the precise
evil to be eliminated."). That a state legislature might adopt a state test of
navigability at odds with the federal navigability test for title is not unlikely.
Many have done precisely that for various reasons.3
If the court adopts the literal definition of "navigability" in HB 141, that
definition requires a showing of current susceptibility for use for commerce and
as a public highway of transportation. Orange St. Opening Br. 34-36. While there
was some slight reference to the susceptibility of these waters to modern boat
travel, there was no evidence of commerce. Id. at 36. This requires a reversal of
the district court's determination that USAC is entitled to access under HB 141.

3 Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Western States' Public Trust

Doctrines: Public Values, Private Rights, and the Evolution Toward an Ecological Public
Trust, 37 ECOLOGY L. Q. 53 (2010) (includes an extensive appendix detailing
navigability laws in the western states) attached as Addendum A. Craig's article
includes an extensive appendix detailing navigability laws in the western states.
5

3.

Neither log drives alone nor use during temporary high water satisfy the
federal navigability for title test
Assuming the federal navigability for title test is the test incorporated in

HB 141, this court has been presented with two straightforward questions about
how that test is satisfied. First, is evidence of occasional log drives only, without
evidence of use of watercraft for transportation, enough to show susceptibility to
use for commerce and transportation?4 Second, is evidence of a water's
susceptibility to use for commerce during times of temporary high water enough
to satisfy the federal test?
The United States Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue,
though the inferences to be fairly drawn from its navigability for title cases
support Orange Street in answering both questions in the negative. Orange Street
Opening Br. at 39-43,51-52. On the whole, the various lower court cases support
Orange Street's position, and those few seemingly against it are analytically
suspect. Id. at 44-54. The State has not addressed the issue on appeal, but
concluded in its trial brief that "the Weber River's relatively low flows, steep

4 Susceptibility of use does not require actual proof of use. "The evidence of the
actual use of streams, and especially of extensive and continued use for
commercial purposes may be most persuasive, but, where conditions of
exploration and settlement explain the infrequency or limited nature of such use,
the susceptibility to use as a highway of commerce may still be satisfactorily
proved." United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 82 (1931). Present day use, while
helpful, "must be confined to that which shows the river could sustain the kinds
of commercial use that, as a realistic matter, might have occurred at statehood."
PPL Montana v. Montana, 132 S.Ct. 1215, 1233 (2012).
6

gradient, and short, inconsistent window of annual utility, raise questions
regarding whether it was navigable-in-fact in 1896." (R. 647)
Orange Street will not revisit arguments already made in the opening
briefs on the merits of the question. Instead, it will briefly address two points not
raised earlier, one legal and one practical. First, in PPL Montana v. Montana, the
U.S. Supreme Court said nothing about log floating as a basis for navigability,
even though the issue was briefed. 132 S.Ct. 1215 (2012). Instead, the Court
focused on the absence of boat travel in declaring the Missouri River nonnavigable through the Great Falls reach. Id. at 1232.
In PPL Montana, Montana argued that logs floating on the Madison River
were enough to establish susceptibility for commerce and to satisfy the federal
navigability test. Br. of Resp't State of Montana, p. 21, attached as Addendum B;
see also Br. of Amicus Curiae, Nat'l Wildlife Fed. et al., p. 25, attached as
Addendum C. In deciding that the Missouri River through the Great Falls reach
was not navigable at statehood, and in discussing the facts relevant to
determining the susceptibility of a waterway being used for trade and travel, the
Court never addressed the issue of the floating of logs.s PPL Montana, 132 S.Ct.
at 1232-33. Rather, it held that the fact that portages were required around the

s In fact, no evidence of log floats on the Missouri River was presented to the
court. But this argument is not about whether log floats actually occurred on the
river, but whether the river was susceptible to log floats at statehood and was
that enough to satisfy navigability requirements.
7

Great Falls reach defeated title for navigability purposes. Id. at 1232. Relying only
on the passage of watercraft, the court stated:
[T]he Court sees no evidence in the record that could demonstrate
that the Great Falls reach was navigable. Montana does not dispute
that overland passage was necessary to traverse the reach. Indeed,
the State admits the falls themselves were not passable by boat at
statehood. And the trial court noted the falls had never been
navigated.

Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, because
boats had to portage around the falls, the river was not navigable.
If susceptibility to floating logs was all that was required for navigability

for title, the outcome would have been different; logs can float over waterfalls
and rapids where boats cannot go. Nor was there an issue about low water. Boats
were able to be navigated above and below the Great Falls reach. The only
reason the Court concluded that the segment was non-navigable was because
"the falls themselves were not passable by boat at statehood." Id. Orange Street
urges this court to follow the Supreme Court's lead and hold that the use of boats
is necessary to establish navigability for title purposes.
Second, and practically, Orange Street notes that if susceptibility to the
floating of logs alone is enough to establish navigability for title purposes,
stretches of Utah's rivers previously determined non-navigable may be opened
up to a new navigability for title analysis. In other words, the stability of
landowners' previously decided entitlement or lack of entitlement to ownership
of beds may be brought into question. For example, in United States v. Utah, the
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Supreme Court decided navigability for title issues regarding the Green River,
Colorado River, and the Grand River (currently the Colorado River above its
confluence with the Green River). 283 U.S. 64 (1931). A section of the Colorado
River through Cataract Canyon was deemed non-navigable because of its rapid
descent and dangerous rapids. Id. at 80. The United States, as the owner of the
adjacent land in Cataract Canyon, therefore has title to the bed underlying that
non-navigable section. Id. at 74. Again, like the Missouri River in PPL Montana,
the decision was not based on insufficient water to carry watercraft. Sections
above and below Cataract Canyon were deemed navigable because boats had
been on those sections or they were susceptible to such use. Id. at 89-90. If a log
floating down the river is enough to make the water way susceptible to
commerce, then the United States' title in Cataract Canyon may very well be void
and Utah may own those beds.6
For these reasons, and the reasons stated in its opening brief, Orange Street
asks the court to reverse the district court's ruling and conclude that the one mile
stretch of the Weber River at issue in this case is not navigable.

6 Similarly, the San Juan River was determined to be non-navigable from Chinle
Creek (5 miles below the town of Bluff) to its confluence with the Colorado River,
a total of 133 miles. Utah, 283 U.S. at 74. Portions of this river are likely able to
float logs and thus be considered navigable under USAC' s test. Adjacent
landowners include the United States, the Navajo Nation, and private interests in
the town of Mexican Hat. Instability of title would open up the possibility of
quiet title actions for all of these land owners.
9

Conclusion

The district court erred in entering a ruling concluding that the State holds
title to the bed of the Weber River where it crosses Orange Street's property
because USAC lacks standing to challenge Orange Street's title. The district court
also plainly erred in not applying the statutory test for navigability set out in HB
141. Finally, even if the federal navigability for title test is the HB 141 test, the
district court failed to apply the proper test.
This court should vacate the title determination and reverse the finding of
navigability and of a right in USAC' s members to access Orange Street's
property for recreational purposes.
DATED this 17th day of June, 2016.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER
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